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Summary:
This paper introduces endogenous adoption costs for productive assets in a Ramsey type growth
model with international capital flows. There are two c1asses of productive assets: owner-specific
and location-specific. Adoption costs are an increasing function of the leve! of technology embodied
in the investor's owner-specific assets and a dec1ining function of the host country's location-specific
assets. In this setting the return to capital is low in capital-poor countries. Consequently, they
receive small amounts of foreign investments. Further, even though capital flows from North are
spread evenlyacross industries in the South, the relative importance of high-technology industries is
small in terms of output.
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1. Introduction
Capital does flow from rich to poor countries, but both stocks and flows are highly
concentrated in a few newly industrialized countries. This investment pattern seems
to be at odds with the neoc1assical growth model which exhibits diminishing returns
to capita!. It predicts that the return to capital is highest in relatively capital-poor
countries, and as a consequence, capital should flow from rich to poor countries if it is
internationally mobile. However, empirical evidence suggests that the rate of return to
capital is not higher in capital-poor than in capital-rich countries (World Bank 1989,
Bardhan 1996). This finding has induced a shift in research emphasis from
imperfections in the international capital markets to analyses of what determines the
rate of return to capital, usually in the context of endogenous growth models.
There are two main strands of endogenous growth models which are concerned with
the low rate of return to capital in relatively capital-poor countries. Both concentrate
on foreign direct investment (FDI), and both explain the coexistence of relative capital
scarcity and low returns to capital by the complementarity between internationally
mobile capital and another factor of production which is not internationally mobile.
The first strand argues that the immobile, complementary factor of production is
human capital (Uzawa 1965, Lucas 1988; 1990; 1993, Fafchamps 1995, Barro,
Mankiw and Sala-i-Marin 1995, Stokey 1996). Poor countries are assumed to be in
relatively short supply of human capital, and relatively meager flows of FDI follow.
The second strand argues that intermediate goods and services are non-tradable and
complementary to capital. In this literature, productivity is determined by the degree
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of specialization, which in turn is determined by the extent of the market. Since small
or poor countries have small markets, the degree of specialization is shallow, and the
return to the primary factors of production is low as a consequence (Faini 1984,
Rodriguez-Clare 1996). There is, however, little empirical evidence that intermediate
goods and services are non-tradable. To the contrary, they constitute a significant and
increasing share of world trade (United Nations 1996). Moreover, small countries
tend to have a similar input -output structure as larger countries, but the import share
of intermediate goods and services is higher (Chenery et. aL. 1986).
In this paper we return to imperfections in the international capital markets and
combine them with complementarities between different types of capital. Thus, we
adopt the idea from the first strand of research that there are two complementary types
of capital, one more internationally mobile than the other. However, our model differs
from the first strand in four important ways: First, while previous papers typically
assume that factors are either perfectly mobile between countries or they do not move
across international boundaries at all, we wish to analyze the more general case with
imperfect international capital markets. Thus, our mode! has the property that
international movements of capital are limited by transaction costs without
eliminating capital movements altogether.
Second, we reinterpret the two types of capital to represent owner-specific and
location-specific capital. In this respect, we build on insights from industrial
organization-based theories of FDI. This literature sees FDI as a strategic decision by
individual companies on where to locate value-adding activities. Such decisions are
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driven by the urge to find the most effcient way of combining the firm's owner-
specific assets with the host country's location-specific assets for each value-adding
activity (Dunning 1993, United Nations 1996).1 This behavior translates into a
maximization problem which is the micro-foundation for the model developed in this
paper. Through this reinterpretation we are able to focus sharplyon the mobility-
dimension. In our context, human capital may well be owner-specific and
internationally mobile, while physical capital assets may be internationally immobile.
In addition, we are able to inc1ude some intangible assets such as the rule of law and
other social infrastructure among the location-specific assets.
Third, as a consequence of our reinterpretation of the two types of capital, we
maintain labor as a separate factor of production. This is necessary because human
capital is usually, explicitly or implicitly, assumed to be embodied in workers, who in
turn may absorb an unlimited amount of it. This is not an appropriate feature of
location-specific capital. Labor is therefore inc1uded and assumed to be in fixed
supply. As a consequence, our model does not generate endogenous growth unless
there are positive externalities related to location-specific capital accumulation. In
contrast, a Cobb-Douglas combination of two types of capital goods only, yields
endogenous growth even in the absence of externalities.
Finally, our model differs from former models regarding the nature of externalities
related to location-specific capital accumulation. The externality in our model reduces
i Even when location specific assets are combined with firm-specific assets of foreign companies, this
does not necessarily result in FDI. Alternative arrangements are joint ventures, licensing or simply
seIlng owner-specific assets to foreign firms. See Markusen (1995) for an overview.
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the adoption cost of owner-specific capital. The existence of such adoption costs is
indicated in several studies. De Lang and Summers (1991) fin d that the real relative
cost of capital goods seems to be paricularly high in developing countries, while
recent estimates of the wealth of nations suggest that the distribution of owner-
specific assets among countries is more uneven than the distribution of location-
specific assets (Dixon and Hamilton 1996). The latter res ult is incompatible with
perfectly mobile owner-specific assets. We argue that it is reasonable to assume that
adoption costs increase with the degree of sophistication of the value adding activity
in which investment is made, and dec1ine with the stock of location-specific assets in
the host country, hence the externality. By combining adoption costs and
differentiated owner-specific assets, we are able to analyze both the amount and the
composition of FDI flowing to the South.
We show that in this setting, the observed international capital flows are consistent
with the neoc1assical growth model. Further, our model predicts that FDI is
distributed equally among different types of value added activities, but the stock of
capital which ends up as an input in the production process is smaller the more
technologically sophisticated the activity for a given leve! of location-specific capital.
Thus, the model is consistent with the observation that even the poorest countries of
the world are linked to the Internet and use cell-phones, although the relative price of
such services are very high. The next section of the paper presents the model, while
section 3 draws some policy implications and section 4 conc1udes.
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2. The model
A Ramsey-type growth model with two types of accumulated assets is developed. The
two types of assets are owner-specific, denoted K, and location-specific, denoted H.
Factor income can be spent on consumer goods or saved, while savings are invested in
H or K, the latter at home or abroad. A world with a fixed common stock of
technology in the form of n blueprints is presupposed. Each blueprint represents a
technology which firms may trans form into owner-specific assets. Such assets are
ranked according to the amount of technology embodied in them. The aggregate stock
of K in the economy is therefore given by:
n
K = L Âik¡ (1)
and is the sum of technology-adjusted assets defined by a quantity parameter k¡ and a
quality parameter, k, Â ~ l. A cost of trans forming each blueprint into productive
assets is incurred by firms and increases with the leve! of sophistication of the
technology. Next, the owner-specific assets are adopted to the location-specific
assets in a particular country. The cost of doing so is assumed to dec1ine with the
stock of location-specific assets available to the investing firm. The cost function then
reads:
Âic. =T-i H (2)
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This formulation has an empirical foundation: The log of initial GDP times the stock
of human capital is usually inc1uded in growth regressions in order to capture the
interaction between GDP and human capital. It is assumed that a higher leve! of
human capital raises the abilty to absorb new technologies and therefore speeds up
the convergence process. As expected, the interaction variable is found to be
inversely related to real growth (Barro and Sala-i-Marin 1995). Equation (2) captures
this empirical relationship by introducing adoption costs proportional to the
complexity of the production process, and inversely proportional to the accumulated
stock of location-specific assets. As a consequence of (2) and the fact that countries
have different endowments of location-specific assets, adoption costs differ among
countries. Adoption costs are assumed to be of the iceberg type which means that one
unit of savings is transformed to 1/ c¡ c: L units of owner-specific assets of quality i.
The stock of effective capital of quality i employed in the economy is therefore given
by:
A
k. = k. / cI I I (3)
From (1) the differentiated asset has more in common with quality ladder models as
developed by Grossman and Helpman (1991) than with vintage models of capital,
although the quality ladder input in our model is indeed capital. Production of final
goods is assumed to be perfectly competitive. Therefore, all producers of final output
can be aggregated into one macro production function, assumed to be of the usual
Cobb-Douglas type:
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y = ALI-a-r Hr :L ( À! k¡ r (4)
or using (1) and (3):
y = ALI-a-r Ha+r:L k¡ a (4')
where Y is total output, or factor income, A is a constant defining the unit of
measurement, A = A / ra and L is labor, which is assumed to be in fixed supply.
With this specification, varieties of the owner-specific assets are not direct substitutes
or complements to each other. Note that the production function exhibits constant
returns to scale in labor, location-specific capital and efficient owner-specific capital
(4), but exhibits increasing returns to scale in labor, location-specific capital and
nominal owner-specific capital when the externality is taken into account (4'). Note
also that when adoption costs are taken into account, the quality parameter is
eliminated and the model reduces from a quality ladder model to a model of
expanding variety. Factor income is consumed or saved according to consumers'
utility maximization problem. Infinitely lived households maximize the standard
constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution utility function:
~ Cl-8 -1
u(c) = f. e-ptdtt i-e (5)
where c is consumption per capita, p is the time preference rate and e is the elasticity
of marginal utility.2 The flow household budget constraint reads:
2 Lower case letters represent per capita figures.
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h+ak+åk = r;,h+rak+w-c (6)
where a is the share of owner-specific assets owned by domestic citizens and r is the
exogenous world market interest rate. Whenever rh ~ r, all domestic savings wil be
invested in location-specific assets, and cr = O. When rh = r on the other hand,
investors are indifferent whether to invest in location-specific assets or owner-specific
assets at home or abroad. In order to keep the focus shar, let us concentrate on
developing countries for which the constraint on capital movements imposed by the
stock of H is binding such that cr :: O. New types of owner-specific assets are always
introduced by foreign investors in such countries and the solution to the standard
Ramsey growth model yields the Euler equation:
C L
C = e (rh - p) (7)
Owner-specific assets of all qualities earn the world market rate of interest, r, in all
countries. The stock of quality i employed in the economy is thus determined by the
condition that its marginal product equals the world market interest rate, which,
applying (2) and (4) yields:
( - J1/(l-a)k¡ = aALI-a-r Ha+r / (r + 8) (8)
where õ is the depreciation rate of owner-specific assets. Note that the "nominal"
stock is independent of the quality parameter Âi . Therefore, the amount of savings
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invested in each and every quality rung of owner-specific assets is the same.
Moreover, this implies that there is only one state variable related to the investment in
owner-specific assets, namely the total stock of k.3 The efficient stock, e.g. the stock
adjusted for adoption costs, however, is smaller the more technologically sophisticated
the asset and the smaller the stock of location-specific assets in the economy.
Applying (3) and (4), it turns out that the marginal product of the nominal and
efficient stock of each rung of owner-specific assets are related as follows:
MPk. = MPk.cr:/(l-a) = (r + 8)cal(l-a)i i l i (9)
The rate of return to the efficient capital stock is thus above the world market interest
rate in capital-poor countries. Condition (9) reconciles the extended neoc1assical
model with the observation that the return to "nominal" capital does not differ much
between countries in spite of the fact that developing countries are relatively poor in
capital. In other worlds, the return to savings are not higher in capital-poor countries,
but the returns to installed, productive capital is higher, as predicted by the
neoc1assical growth model. Since it is the rate of return to savings that matters to the
international investor, capital does not flow from rich to poor countries to the extent
predicted by the simplest version of the neoc1assical growth model.
3 The majority of authors working with growth models with differentiated inputs take sueh inputs to be
intermediate goods and serviees. This is done in order to foeus on the issue at stake while avoiding the
eomplexity of an additional state variable that a differentiated capital input would involve. The
additional state variable would be the number of horizontally or vertieally differentiated capital goods.
In this paper the additional state variable is eliminated by the eost function, which is not entirely
unrealistic.
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Our model can be read as a reduced form model of a multi-good economy in which
consumers have homothetic preferences (see Stokey 1996). Understood in this way,
equation (8) together with (3) can be interpreted to predict that the smaller the stock of
location-specific assets in a country, the smaller the tlow of FDI, and the smaller the
share of high-technology industries in total output. Finally, note that in steady state
when rh = r, savings wil be allocated among the two kinds of assets such that
H / nk = r / a, and the production function can be expressed as a function of
location-specific assets only, when the labor force and the number of blueprints are
given: Y = ÃH2a+r where Ã = AL1-a-r nl-a (a / yr) 
a . It is, thus, accumulation of
location-specific assets that drives the model.
The foreign investor takes the stock of location-specific assets as given, while local
investors in location-specific assets do not take into account the impact on adoption
costs when they take the investment decision. Hence (2) introduces an externality
related to investment into the model. The externality implies that the decentralized
market sol uti on to the Ramsey model is not the social optimum, and there is room for
policy measures to improve welfare. The market sol uti on to the Ramsey problem is
found by substituting the equilibrium condition that the value of the marginal product
of location-specific assets, disregarding the externality, equals the interest rate into the
Euler equation. Using (4) and (8) this yields:
ë =~(rALl-a-rHa+r-lnka -8-p)
C e (lO)
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where the depreciation rate is assumed to be the same for both types of capital. It is
well known that when the savings rate as well as the world market interest rate are
constant over time, both output and the stock of location-specific capital grow in
tandem with consumption. (10) then represents the growth rate of output as well. The
social planner takes the externality into account. Her optimal level of investment in
location-specific assets is thus given by the condition that the value of the marginal
product of H in equation (4') equals the interest rate. Inserting this into the Euler
equation yields:
~ = ~ ((a + y)AL1-a-r Ha+r-1nka - Ô - p) (11)
The social optimum growth rate of consumption given by (11) is clearly higher than
the market solution, since a + y ~ a. Hence, it is apparent that the externality leads to
under-investment in location-specific assets. We therefore turn to policy measures to
achieve the social optimum.
3. Policy implications
The obvious policy implication derived from comparing (10) and (11) is to introduce a
subsidy on investment in location-specific assets at a rate Sh = (a + y) / Â.
Alternatively, a subsidy rate of Sk = ((a + y)/y)o-ai/a on foreign investment would
have the same effect.4 Whenever a c: 1/2, Sh c: Sko Empirical findings (Mankiw Romer
4 The subsidy rate is found by substituting (8) into (10) and (11) and compare the results.
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and Weil 1992) suggest that this is the case. When the relative share of H in
production is sufficiently small (see the appendix), the subsidy per unit of output is
smallest when levied on location-specific assets. In that case, the optimal growth path
can be attained at the lowest budgetary outlay by subsidizing location-specific assets.
From this it can be concluded that if government takes care of location-specific assets,
either through subsidizing private investment in such assets or through government
investment, owner specific asset flows wil take care of itself. Government
investment in location-specific assets beyond the point where H/nk = y/a would,
however, be inefficient. Finally it should be stressed that since the model is highly
stylized and captures only a few aspects of reality, policy implications are only
suggestive.
4. Summary and conclusions
Lucas (1990) raised the question why capital does not flow from rich to poor countries
and suggested that the reason has to do with a low stock of human capital and the
existence of local externalities from investment in human capital. In a more recent
paper (Lucas 1993), he emphasizes the implication that the main engine of growth is
accumulation of human capital, while physical capital is essential but plays a
subsidiar role
This paper supports Lucas' conc1usions, reinterpreted to location and owner-specific
capital. In addition, we argue that (iceberg) adoption costs to owner-specific assets
12
further reduce the return to both owner-specific and location-specific capital. These
costs pose a wedge between the amount of savings utilized by the investor and the
effcient stock of assets employed in the production process. In our model, therefore,
the rate of return to owner-specific capital is not only depressed by a small stock of
complementary location-specific assets, the return to the latter is also depressed by
high adoption-costs to owner-specific assets.
We introduce a new dimension to the mode! by differentiating owner -specific assets
according to the amount of technology embodied in them Jf the array of ascending
quality parameters is interpreted as increasingly technologically sophisticated
industries, the model predicts precisely the industrial structure found in poor
countries: The industrial base is narrow and the share of high-technology industries
and services is small, but usually not zero, with high relative prices of high-tech goods
and services. Finally, our specification of the cost and externality structure allows us
to deal with differentiated capital goods without the complication of an additional
state variable.
Appendix
Subsidies on H and K per unit of output are determined by the first order condition
from the profit-maximization problem. Using (1) and (3) this yields:
H=--y and nk =~yrh + 8 r + 8 AI
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The optimal subsidy rate per unit of output for the two types of assets are therefore:
s - a + r andhy - rh + 8
l-a
_ a (a + rJ-;Sk -- -y r+8 r A2
It remains to show under which conditions S hy -: Sky' Rearranging A2 we find that the
inequality hol ds when:
l-a
1 r rh + 8 (1 a J-;+-.;- +-a r+8 r A3
which is fulfiled for reasonable parameter values.
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